Hopefully Anonymous

I'm 3 months ahead of the curve in criticizing Daschle pick, And Obama's 3 biggest weaknesses

1. Most of my november 2008 posts included criticisms of the Daschle pick and suggestions of alternatives. I think this is my first one, from November 23, 2008. Despite revalations about what some might consider questionable income and tax fraud, I think the most damning thing about Daschle is simply is lack of demonstrated qualifications to be appointed to administer the largest departmental bureacracy, administering some very technical institutions, in the Federal governent.

http://hopeanon.typepad.com/my_weblog/2008/11/thoughts-on-obama-administration-picks-focus-on-picking-experts-not-rivals.html

2. Obama's biggest decision making weaknesses, as they're shaping up:

a. Excessive loyalty, the same weakness as Bush. Bill Clinton stands in sharp contrast: he was able to jettison nominations and fire staffers (some paranoid conservatives claim he was able to do a little more than that) that would otherwise cause harm to his administration.

b. Fear of political rivals. The best way to get nominated for the best jobs in the Obama administration? Qualifications for the particular job don't see to matter as much as the popularity and resume to run against him in the 2012 Democrat primaries.

c. Being a Senator is a qualification for everything. Unfortunately, making the Senate to approving body on all high level presidential appointments, including when Senators are nominated, enables him on this. I'd be interested in an amendment giving the House the power to confirm appointments of candidates who were most recently Senators. The Senate is too collegial and seems incapable of rejecting a nominated Senator for any position.

Good post in defense of Prof. Sunstein, and related thoughts

h/t a regular emailer.

I like this post defending Sunstein, and also puts in a good mention for Prof. Resvesz.

http://volokh.com/posts/1233083382.shtml

Does the administration have any public choice theory experts on board? Because I think that would be very helpful paired with cost/benefit analysis when looking at regulation.

Incidentally, is Rahm Emmanuel becoming dead weight? If so, I encourage Prez. Obama to jettison him. I was never impressed by Emmanuel's intellectual credentials, and it seems Prez. Obama has already been reduced to looking for non administrative errands to send Emmanuel on, like a failed effort at lining up Republican votes for the stimulus package.

Also, I highly recommend two more czars to add to the multitudes:

(1) decision theory czar, operating out of the White House and coordinating the world's experts to help optimize decision making, and

(2) anti-scandal czar. Working preemptively on things like marital infidelity, bribery, unethical fundraising, etc. Surpised that's never been done before.

Brain Droppings Friday January 30, 2009

1. The idea to focus on our social epistemology of disaster response seems

sound. A disaster is ipso facto evidence of technocratic incompetence

relative to existential risk. We would want a maximally efficient

epistemological response, to maximize our odds of being able to thwart the

next disaster before it occurs. Having said that, this abstract seems to my

non-expert eye to be filled with postmodern bullshit. In contrast I'd be

interested in Dr. Bostrom's take on this topic.

http://ubiwar.com/2008/12/23/disasterologies/

Tony Grajeda (2005), ‘Disasterologies’, Journal of Social Epistemology,

Vol.19, No.4, pp.315-319 (DOI: 10.180/02691720500145381)

Abstract:

This brief position paper explores our current confrontation with

technology through a model of the accident. Focusing on failure, risk and

malfunctioning technology, the paper offers the notion of disasterologies

as an alternative approach to technology studies. Such an approach suggests

both a less deterministic and instrumentalized drive than is often found in

theories of technology and society as well as a less certain role of the

subject in its relation to technology. Disasterologies re-imagines the

accident as that which eludes the modern subject’s mastery over the built

environment through scientific knowledge and “technological rationality.”

By foregrounding when technology fails, disasterologies implies a subject

neither entirely in control nor entirely at the mercy of technology, one

whose condition of contingency re-opens questions of agency,

intentionality, and subjectivity itself.

2. Although I share Sheppard's sentiment that a GOP takeover of the House

in 2010 would be a good thing, key is for the right type of Republicans

(competent, intelligent, open to expert insight) to win the the Republican

primaries in blue congressional districts likely to swing red in 2010. He

doesn't seem to care much about what types of Republicans win the 2010

primaries. That's a damn shame. Also, it's a damn shame that he's

encouraging Republicans to vote as a block against the stimulus plan using

weak citation to experts. No name checking of the best experts and best

explanations for opposing the stimulus plan. Thus, I think the theatrics

hear are harmful from the perspective of promoting the type of political

competition that maximizes positive externalities.

http://foxforum.blogs.foxnews.com/2009/01/28/sheppard_obama_economy/

3. 200 economists against government spending to stimulate the economy:

http://cfpolicyblog.blogspot.com/2009/01/200-economists-against-

stimulus.html

4. The 10 top ranked economists according to ideas.repec.org

1. Joseph E. Stiglitz
2. Andrei Shleifer
3. Robert J. Barro
4. James J. Heckman
5. Robert E. Lucas
6. Peter C.B. Phillips
7. Edward C. Prescott
8. Martin S. Feldstein
9. Jean Tirole
10. Daron Acemoglu

Incoherent Expert Republican Opposition to the Bailout, Coherent Non-Expert

Republican Opposition to the Bailout

I myself am a non-expert, which should be noted when evaluating my

analysis. It seems to me that the expert republican opposition to the Obama

stimulus proposal (that is opposition by Republican economists with

expertise in this area) isn't unified in approach and is a bit incoherent

when viewed in total. In contrast, the opposition by non-expert republican

leaders, such as politicians and media commenters, seems pretty coherent:

they claim to think that it's a retread of the New Deal and won't work as a

result.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harvard_Law_Review

Post Obama Presidents of Harvard Law Review (106th-122nd Presidents
1. 106th (1992-1993)
2. 107th (1993-1994)
3. 108th (1994-1995)
4. 109th (1995-1996)
5. 110th (1996-1997)
6. 111th (1997-1998)
7. 112th (1998-1999)
8. 113th (1999-2000)
9. 114th (2000-2001) Anne K. Small
10. 115th (2001-2002) Matthew Hellman, Class of 2002, 24 years old when

became President
11. 116th (2002-2003) Bert I. Huang
12. 117th (2003-2004) Daniel B. Kirschner, graduated magna cum laude from

Harvard Law
13. 118th (2004-2005) Thiru Vignarajah
14. 119th (2005-2006) Brian Fletcher, after graduation clerked with Judge

Merrick Garland of Court of Appeals, District of Columbia
15. 120th (2006-2007) Aileen McGrath
16. 121st (2007-2008) Andrew Manuel Crespo, from Monroe, New York, Harvard

College undergrad, first Hispanic President of Harvard Law Review
17. 122nd (2008-2009) Robert Allen, Sears Prize Winner, High School Debate

Champion, "Best Senior Thesis" Prize in college, from Buckhead, Georgia,

majored in economics at Emory University, graduated Phi Beta Kappa,

graduated from Buckhead Academy for high school

http://johnboehner.house.gov/Biography/

John Boehner (Bay-ner), elected to represent the Eighth Congressional

District of Ohio for a ninth term in November 2006, continues to be a key

leader in the fight for a more limited and accountable federal government.

Born in Cincinnati in November 1949 as one of 12 brothers and sisters, John

has lived in Southwest Ohio his entire life. He and his wife Debbie have

been married for 33 years. They have two daughters – Lindsay and Tricia –

and live in the northern Cincinnati suburb of West Chester. After

graduating from Cincinnati’s Moeller High School in 1968, John earned a

bachelor’s degree in business from Xavier University in Cincinnati in 1977.

Upon his graduation, he accepted a position with Nucite Sales, a small

sales business in the packaging and plastics industry, and eventually

became president of the firm. While working in the private sector, John

entered the political arena – first serving as Union Township trustee from

1982 to 1984 and then as a representative to the Ohio state legislature

from 1984 to 1990.

In 1990, he was elected to represent Ohio’s Eighth Congressional District

in the United States House of Representatives.

***

The wrong way to have opposed George W. Bush?
Dr. Stiglitz seems to provide an unhelpful, unprofessional critique of

DARPA's experiment with prediction markets. It reminds me of the "Send in

the clones" critique of human cloning by Dr. Weisberg in The Atlantic,

years ago.

http://articles.latimes.com/2003/jul/31/opinion/oe-stiglitz31

"Terrorism: There’s No Futures in It
By Joseph E. Stiglitz
July 31, 2003 in print edition B-17

The Bush administration’s naive belief in free-market economics reached a

new level of absurdity this week with the proposal to create a futures

market in terrorism. The argument behind the proposal was simple:

Information is valuable, and information about a possible terrorist attack

is particularly valuable.

One of the often-lauded virtues of futures markets is their ability to

bring together disparate economic information and add it up together (or

“aggregate it,” as economists say).

In a futures market, participants agree to trade, at a pre- negotiated

price, commodities that have not yet been produced. Buyers hope that on the

day of delivery the price they’ve paid will turn out to be low – lower than

the prices then prevailing on the market – while sellers hope just the

opposite.

Studies have shown that in some instances prices negotiated today on a

futures market can serve as a reasonably good predictor of what the price

will be on the day of delivery. Consider the futures market for wheat in

September. If today’s price in that market is $3.39 per bushel, then $3.39

is a good prediction of what the price for wheat will be. Economists refer

to this as the “price discovery” function and believe such markets may not

only predict the price of corn or wheat but also election outcomes.

Almost 30 years ago, Sanford Grossman and I investigated theoretically the

validity of these claims. We focused on competitive markets in which we

assumed participants had some relevant information. For instance, a farmer

knows something about his own crop, so if he participates in a futures

market he will bring his knowledge to bear on that market. Voters who

participate in a futures market also bring relevant information – whom they

and their friends are voting for – and that is why futures markets may

predict presidential elections reasonably well.

But there are severe limitations in the ability of markets to provide

accurate predictions; for instance, where markets have few participants and

can be easily manipulated, or where there are large asymmetries of

information, with some participants (the few large international chocolate

producers, for example, in the cocoa futures market) having far more

information than others.

Futures markets provide insurance as well as information: They enable a

farmer/trader to reduce the risks he faces resulting from the fluctuations

in commodity prices. But by providing “insurance” for participants, futures

markets can also create the long-noted “moral hazard” problem – the notion

that insurance can alter incentives. Someone who has insured his house for

110% of its value has an incentive to set it afire.

What, then, are we to make of the short-lived proposal by the Pentagon’s

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency for a terrorism futures market?

Did it reflect a brilliant breakthrough, an extension of market processes

into an area where markets, by themselves, feared to tread? Or did it

represent market fundamentalism descending to a new level of absurdity?

Under the proposal, which the administration disowned almost as soon as it

became public, participants would have been betting, in effect – and

perhaps profiting – on such potential events as an attack by North Korea or

an assassination of Yasser Arafat.

Of course, no one expected DARPA’s John M. Poindexter – notorious for his

eventually overturned conviction for lying to Congress about Irangate – to

approach the problem from the perspective of economic theory. But what was

he thinking? Did he believe there is widespread information about terrorist

activity not currently being either captured or appropriately analyzed by

the “experts” in the FBI and the CIA? Did he believe that the 1,000 people

“selected” for the new futures program would have this information? If so,

shouldn’t these people be investigated rather than rewarded?

But there are more fundamental problems with the idea. If trading is

anonymous, then it could be subject to manipulation, particularly if the

market has few participants – providing a false sense of security or an

equally dangerous false sense of alarm. If trading is not anonymous, then

anyone with information about terrorism would be, understandably, reluctant

to trade on it. In that case, the market would not serve its purpose.

Now consider the second function of futures markets – insurance. The

Pentagon’s proposal would have allowed those with the sophistication and

money to “hedge” against the threat of terrorism, financially at least,

leaving the rest of Americans fully exposed! Though we have come to expect

such inequities from the Bush administration’s tax policies, surely the

U.S. government should be concerned with the exposure of all Americans to

terrorism.

Notice that in proposing this idea, at least the Bushies are recognizing

the limitations of the innovative capacity of markets. If this is such a

good idea, why haven’t the markets created it on their own?

Interestingly, the group promoting the idea, DARPA, had – before Bush took

over – a credible record of promoting some important innovations, including

an important role in the early days of the Internet.

In its own peculiar way, the administration has once again recognized the

limitations of markets – as it did with the airline bailouts, steel tariffs

and agriculture subsidies. But once again, the lack of intellectual

foundation or a firm grasp of economic principles – or the pursuit of other

agendas – has led to a proposal that almost seems a mockery of itself."

***

US Term Limits organization:

http://www.termlimits.org

Recent article in favor of congressional term limits:

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/duncan-quirk/legislative-term-

limits_b_159632.html

Old article by Richard Posner assessing term limits for federal judges

http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/archives/2005/03/judicial_term_l.html

***

Top Macroeconomists:

http://ideas.repec.org/top/top.mac.html#authors

1. 2.6 M Hashem Pesaran 
http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/faculty/pesaran/
2. 3.37 Olivier Blanchard
http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/blanchar/index.htm
3. 3.86 Michael Woodford 
4. 3.95 Lars E. O. Svensson 
5. 4.93 Jordi Gali 
6. 5 Mark L. Gertler 
7. 8.99 Robert G. King 
*8. 9.16 N. Gregory Mankiw 
9. 9.19 Thomas J. Sargent 
10. 9.68 Frederic Mishkin 
11. 10.27 Patrick Kehoe 
*12. 10.95 Robert J. Barro 
13. 12.18 Willem Hendrik Buiter 
14. 12.35 John B. Taylor 
*15. 18.85 Ben S. Bernanke 
16. 19.36 Edmund S. Phelps 
17. 19.5 James Hamilton 
18. 20.66 Bennett McCallum 
19. 21.64 Frank Rafael Smets 
20. 24.16 David Romer 
21. 24.27 Adrian Rodney Pagan 
22. 25.24 Andrew Hughes Hallett 
23. 25.26 Athanasios Orphanides 
24. 27.38 Alex Cukierman 
25. 27.98 Robert J. Gordon 
26. 28.21 Jess Benhabib 
27. 28.27 Maurice Obstfeld 
28. 28.53 Glenn D. Rudebusch 
29. 28.53 Marvin Goodfriend 
30. 30.64 Ricardo J. Caballero 
31. 31.17 Richard Rogerson 
32. 31.28 Gary D. Hansen 
33. 31.38 James H. Stock 
34. 31.47 Robert C. Merton 
35. 32.49 Laurence Ball 
36. 32.54 George William Evans 
37. 34.07 Randall Wright 
38. 35.84 Edward C. Prescott 
39. 36.1 Stephen J Turnovsky 
40. 36.23 Edward Nelson 
41. 37.16 Finn E. Kydland 
42. 37.71 Anil K Kashyap 
43. 39.44 David Laidler 
44. 41.29 Varadarajan Chari 
45. 42.49 Seppo Mikko Sakari Honkapohja 
46. 42.49 Martin Eichenbaum 
47. 42.8 Andrew Theo Levin 
48. 46.48 Walter Erwin Diewert 
49. 47.06 Dale T. Mortensen 
50. 47.44 Christopher F Baum 
51. 49.61 Ellen R. McGrattan 
52. 50.43 Stefan Gerlach 
53. 50.67 Sergio T Rebelo 
54. 51.24 John C. Williams 
55. 52.52 Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé 
56. 55.89 Lawrence Christiano 
57. 58.79 Alan S. Blinder 
58. 59.59 Roberto Perotti 
59. 59.68 Shouyong Shi 
60. 60.1 Daniel L Thornton 
61. 60.46 David B. Gordon 
62. 60.71 Alberto Alesina 
63. 61.86 Brent Richard Moulton 
64. 62.84 Harald Uhlig 
65. 63.52 Michael David Bordo 
66. 65.13 Andrew Kenan Rose 
67. 65.33 Christopher Carroll 
68. 66.84 Geert Bekaert 
69. 67.04 Stephen D. Williamson 
70. 68.25 Roger E. A. Farmer 
71. 68.89 Gregor W. Smith 
72. 69.82 Martín Uribe 
73. 70.82 Ricardo Reis 
74. 72.06 William Arnold Barnett 
75. 72.32 Alain Monfort 
76. 75.27 Christopher A Pissarides 
77. 75.48 Raf Wouters 
78. 76.85 James Bullard 
79. 77.62 John Muellbauer 
80. 78.84 Zvi Hercowitz 
81. 79.41 Eric Leeper 
82. 79.85 Michael B. Devereux 
83. 81.33 Douglas W. Diamond 
84. 82.18 Ilian Mihov 
85. 84.93 Volker Wieland 
86. 85.11 Francis X. Diebold 
87. 86.94 William Thomas Gavin 
88. 88.58 Carl Walsh 
89. 88.8 Giancarlo Corsetti 
*90. 90.56 Christina Duckworth Romer 
91. 91.55 Lucrezia Reichlin 
92. 94.64 Argia M Sbordone 
93. 94.69 Stephen Cecchetti 
94. 96.35 Andrew Atkeson 
95. 96.6 Carmen M. Reinhart 
96. 97.58 Ray C. Fair 
97. 97.79 David Backus 
98. 97.84 Michael Ehrmann 
99. 100.4 Robert H. Rasche 
100. 101.14 Peter N. Ireland 
101. 101.29 Roel Maria Wilhelmus Jozef Beetsma 
102. 101.71 Matthew D. Shapiro 
103. 102.63 Matthew Buford Canzoneri 
104. 103.97 Valerie Ann Ramey 
105. 105.95 Enrique G. Mendoza 
106. 106.76 Pete Klenow 
107. 107.57 Michael John Artis 
108. 107.58 Timothy Cogley 
109. 107.71 A. Patrick L. Minford 
110. 107.94 Kenneth Neil Kuttner 
111. 107.95 Pierre Siklos 
112. 108.04 Jeremy Greenwood 
113. 108.44 Tamim A Bayoumi 
114. 109.04 Peter Howitt 
115. 109.36 Frank Schorfheide 
116. 115.53 Michael R. Wickens 
117. 116.28 Karl Shell 
118. 116.33 Jeffrey Lacker 
119. 118.17 Miles Spencer Kimball 
120. 119.71 Nathan Balke 
121. 120.55 Carlo Favero 
122. 120.81 Kevin L. Kliesen 
123. 121.08 Paolo A. Pesenti 
124. 122.38 Jakob de Haan 
125. 122.62 Francesco Giavazzi 
126. 124.62 Pierpaolo Benigno 
127. 125.28 Ronald Patrick Smith 
128. 127.15 Lee Edward Ohanian 
129. 127.57 Jean-Pierre Danthine 
130. 127.68 Paul Leslie Levine 
131. 127.84 Charles Wyplosz 
132. 129.09 Jean-Pascal Benassy 
133. 129.24 Sylvester Eijffinger 
134. 130.19 Peter Tinsley 
135. 130.32 Jean Boivin 
136. 130.39 Günter Coenen 
137. 131.27 Thomas F. Cooley 
138. 131.87 Christopher Waller 
139. 132.3 Douglas Laxton 
140. 132.35 John Driffill 
141. 133.3 Charles Engel 
142. 137.13 Joseph Haubrich 
143. 138.62 Jeffrey C. Fuhrer 
144. 139.72 Paul Beaudry 
145. 140.58 Prakash Loungani 
146. 140.96 David H. Papell 
147. 141.43 Stephen M. Miller 
148. 141.49 Tao Zha 
149. 141.83 Massimiliano Marcellino 
150. 142.64 Marcel Fratzscher

***

Nightmares promote bonding in women?

***

An basic quantitative, empirical indication that we're much dumber than we need to be:
Google Searches:

"quantitative measure of" gets several hundred thousand results.

"quantitative measure of expert consensus" gets zero results.

"quantitative measure of expert" gets two results.

"quantitative measure of consensus" gets two results, although they are interesting.

"experimental social" gets several hundred thousand results.

"experimental social epistemology" gets seven results, although they are interesting.

Good post from a couple weeks ago about the economist blogosphere vs. Fama dust-up

An interesting look into the social epistemology of elite economist bloggers:

http://www.portfolio.com/views/blogs/market-movers/2009/01/15/the-blogosphere-vs-eugene-fama

Prof. Kling previews his presentation against the stimulus bill

This seems like a helpful post by Prof. Kling.

http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2009/01/an_anti-stimulu.html#more

Unlike fanboy Russel in the comments, who thinks Prof. Kling is a consistent voice of reason, I think he alternates between really good economic explanations and analysis for a lay readership, and shrill and snippy posts that read like bumper stickers on the car of a middle brow conservative libertarian. It's a strange divide, at least for me as a reader.

Comparing Nations, Banking Regulations, and Financial Outcomes: A natural experiment?

The first article is on what countries may be the next Iceland. Great Britain is at the top of the list. In contrast, Spain apparently weathered the first round of bank collapses because of a particular set of regulations on their banks.

What's the best expert (non-ideological) analysis of this?

Regulation levels and types seems to me to be an important thing to get right, but discussions can be quickly perverted by libertarian and redistributive ideologues.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4648&page=0

http://www.reuters.com/article/rbssFinancialServicesAndRealEstateNews/idUSLR2842620090127

"While their European peers have required government bailouts over the last few months, Spanish banks have benefited from Bank of Spain regulation implemented after the Spain's last economic crisis which obliged them to build up a cushion of provisions."

Steve Sailor's paternalistic school discipline comment

In this edition of "Where's Steve-o", Mr.  Sailor pops up in the comments of Yglesias blog posting a variant of an idea I'm supportive of.

http://yglesias.thinkprogress.org/archives/2009/01/getting_to_effectiveness.php#comment-1059758

My stronger variant of this idea is making the default level of liberty at a level empirically demonstrated to give the best outcomes for populations, but then allow movement to greater levels of liberty through demonstration of qualifications.

This could involve making a level of savings opt out rather than opt in, making full-time work mandatory, for example (unless one demonstrated alternative productivity).

I'm aware of the standard libertarian critiques, but I'd like to note that in some ways this proposal is more libertarian than the current state (most restraints are opt-outable), and any solid libertarian critique should be rooted in empiricism rather than on romantic or mythological first principles.

How Republicans Should Oppose Obama: The Dr. Feldstein Example

I'm not an expert. I have no idea, independently, which is the most politically realistic way to oppose Obama while maximizing positive externalities for the United States.

Separately, I have no idea what the best politically achievable approach (or the best theoretical approach) is to manage the U.S. economy. Given that there seems to be an expert behind just about every theoretical approach except 100% central planning, it seems reasonably possible to me that there's not an obvious best approach yet.

However, stylistically I like Dr. Feldstein's opposition to Obama. He has a concrete alternative proposal, he demonstrates a path to its political achievement, and he presents it with a competent expert's temperment (rather than a shrill ideologues.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/28/AR2009012802938.html

I think the biggest problem today is the stupidity and unprofessionalism of Obama's opposition. He remains an outlier in both parties, and that's a shame. A purge needs to occur of the idiots in both parties' political leadership, even in the rank and file. That's a big project, but it could start with Republican primaries for democrat districts likely to swing red in 2010.

We need Republicans to promote and reward people like Dr. Feldstein. Not, needless to say, people like Governor Palin or even Senator McCain.

The entity being managed, the US, is a trillion dollar economy consisting of 300 million people. Dr. Feldstein's acting like it. President Obama's acting like it. In a population of 300 million, their performances of competent expertise is too rare.

EDIT: More stylistically intelligent, competent, and sober criticisms of Obama and Democrats can be found on this Gary Becker, Richard Posner joint blog. Mankiw, take note: they accept comments!

Professor Mankiw, Open up your comments, like Dr. Krugman does

Dr. Krugman attracts some interesting commenters, although they agree with him too much, IMO.

http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/01/27/a-dark-age-of-macroeconomics-wonkish/

Professor Mankiw's blog loses a lot of useful content by not doing the same.

As one commenter in the thread points out (Athene?) different economists are not discussing and debating their ideas enough, particularly in public media, with regard to the stimulus. Why is Dr. Krugman debating Sam Donaldson instead of Prof. Mankiw? And why is Prof. Mankiw sitting in a corner by himself, putting up blog posts with closed comments?

You're killing us.

Liberals Distrust Fallible Prediction Markets, Conservatives Distrust Fallible Expert Consensus, Both Utilize Their Distrust Poorly

Prediction markets are often, maybe even usually, wrong. Expert consensus is often, maybe usually, wrong. It's good that skeptics point that out. But skeptics should also point out that we have NO BETTER TOOLS for making predictions about the future to guide our decision making.

In particular, it should be more transparently acknowledged by skeptics that the best critical analysis of the failings of both expert consensus and prediction markets is done by -the relevant experts.

An example of this common failing (I've also seen it demonstrated by Jonah Goldberg, and I believe, by Will Wilkinson):

http://hennessysview.com/2009/01/26/experts-are-usually-wrong-so-have-the-experts-rule-everything/?owa_from=feed&owa_sid