This will be a bit messy, a bunch of jottings in notepad that I just want to get onto the internet and make search available. Hopefully you can understand it. I don't have time or inclination to edit it to make it more readable (sorry). And some of it may have even been posted before (the earlier stuff, if any).
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TGGP, nothing startlingly insightful. Just when there is agreement about desired outcome, the legislation that has the greater probability of achieving that desired outcome among multiple options is the better legislation, by technocratic standards. The decision that it's better for one's healthy cellular systems to persist over a longer period of time than for one's cancerous brain cells to maximize growth over a shorter period of time is a normative decision. The best way to remove or thwart those cancerous brain cells is a technocratic decision.
(Once again, I understand there can always be niggling about this, but I think the broad concept is solid).
So, I think we want neurosurgeons that are technically competent, and I think we want legislators and administrators that are technically competent. Hence the law professor/public policy professor standard. Although I'm leaning towards experimental social scientist as the archetypal model for lawmakers, and I'll probably right about that in a post soon (as well as explaining why I think they should be at the top of the scientific hierarchy, above theoretical physicists, for example).
TGGP, I care about agreement because it allows for apples to apples comparison about technocratic achievement. Being a technocrat is about process. Being an ideologue is about fundamental goals (which could sometimes be about process, but don't have to be) it seems to me. So the agreement aspect is just to eliminate ideological noise in order to assess technocratic capability. For example, nazi germany and the USA share agreement that trains should run on time. Americans generally favorably assess nazi technocratic ability to manage railways. The soviets and the americans shared a goal for essential goods for common citizens to be easily accessible. When soviets saw that markets were a superior technocratic tool to achieve this than centrally planned approaches, they began to implement markets into their economic distribution mechanism.
http://www.policyintegrity.org
technocratic institute new to nyu law
atheists are lousy people because it's a self-selected group of people willing to publicly and nonanonymously refute popular myths.
Instead of separation of church and state we should have state experimentation with religion (different myths, or lack thereof, in different regions, to determine which results in the best consequences).
http://news.kontentkonsult.com/2008/12/manipulation-of-gold-prices.html
Fascinating analysis. I know too little about macroeconomics to know if it's insightful or crackpot.
Important update on Dr. Ishii
http://www.counterpunch.org/reed05272006.html
This breathless, manic post is both exciting and scary:
http://www.acceleratingfuture.com/people-blog/?p=2169
Martin Ginsberg, magna cum laude, harvard law:
http://www.atlantainjurylawblog.com/legal-profession-a-refreshingly-unstuffy-lawyer-bio.html
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JD, MPA, PhD profiles:
http://www.linkedin.com/pub/3/b37/868
Alex C. Sienkiewicz
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Stephen Foreman, PhD, JD, MPA, Associate Vice President of Academic Affairs, Robert Morris University
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Pauline Sieverding, PhD, JD, MPA
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http://experts.ttu.edu/browse/profile/400
http://www.law.ttu.edu/faculty/bios/sutton/
Victoria Sutton (Vickie Sutton), MPA, PHD, JD
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Kennard D. Brown
Ken Brown, JD, MPA, PhD
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Joshua M. Chanin, JD, MPA, PhD
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Charles H. Wilson III
http://radar.ngcsu.edu/~chwilson/
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Kevin Marshall JD, MPA, PhD
Kevin S. Marshall
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Brian Nickerson, PhD, JD, MPA.
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Deleon, Patrick H., PhD, MPA, JD. 2000
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JD, PHD (econ)
Josh Wright (J.D. PhD. Econ.)
Daniel Kessler (Stanford Business School Jd, Phd econ)
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JD, PHD (Math)
Thomas Brennan
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/faculty/profiles/ThomasBrennan/
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these mythmaking technocrats seem to exist in a different magesteria than the uberempiricists and hyperrationals. I'd like to best criticisms of their work by TGGP, Douglas Knight, Mitchell Peters, Caledonian, and others. BEST CRITICISMS, not easy countermythologies.
Mythmaking Technocrats:
Lani Guineer's latest:
http://www.harvardlawreview.org/issues/122/nov08/guinier.pdf
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Four people much better qualified to be appointed to the New York Senate Seat
http://www.albany.edu/rockefeller/pad/faculty_1/dawes.htm
Sharon Dawes
http://www.albany.edu/rockefeller/pad/faculty_1/faerman.htm
Sue Faerman
http://www.albany.edu/rockefeller/pad/faculty_1/pardo.htm
Theresa A. Pardo
http://www.albany.edu/rockefeller/pad/faculty_1/saidel.htm
Judith R. Saidel
When soviets saw that markets were a superior technocratic tool to achieve this than centrally planned approaches, they began to implement markets into their economic distribution mechanism.
I think that may have been the Yugoslavians (although most would say they "attempted" to do so). The Soviets did make better use of incentives when it came to things like nuclear bombs (either Bryan Caplan or Eric Crampton makes that point arguing against the Austrian calculation problem).
Guiner is so openly into mythmaking it hardly seems worthwhile critiquing her. I didn't read her whole paper, but part of the point seemed to be celebrating mythmaking, "drama" and appealing to the "hearts" of the public. I am reminded of the circularity of Chris Green's argument for textualism because the text of the Constitution instructs us to do so. It's persuasive if (like me) you accept the text itself as a gold standard (though I prefer the Articles of Confederation), but that's just the point at contention.
I don't even disagree with Guinier and Justice Breyer on the legal matter, as I disagree with Brown v. Board on the constitutionality of such school policies. This sort of thing is more John Rosenberg's bag (though he is an un-self-conscious mythmaker and wrong about dropping reliance on test scores for everybody).
Speaking of that, I remember you mentioning former Harvard president Rudenstine as a mythmaker, but I don't think his paper is available online.
Posted by: TGGP | December 22, 2008 at 06:42 PM
I should actually give some kudos to Guinier. She's mashing democracy as applause button, but Caplan's right that having a Supreme Court throw out laws as unconstitutional is inherently undemocratic. To a more genuine democratic fundamentalist, there's an argument to be had over that. I think Guinier is on shaky ground labeling the court largely "conservative" in addition to white and male. My guess is that the general public is relatively authoritarian and prejudiced compared to the courts. As both Samuel Huntington and Eric Alterman will tell you, voters seem to reject affirmative action whenever it comes up in a referendum, even when both major parties, the universities and business establishment are on the other side. I'm really not sure why the universities are such big fans of it. I don't see what they really gain out of it. Mencius Moldbug has a theory, but I don't find it plausible. This stuff about a.a should have gone with my comment mentioning Rudinstine, since Guinier's piece was about public schools, but I forgot to put it there.
Posted by: TGGP | December 22, 2008 at 06:59 PM
The various theories for why racial affirmative action exists are probably not all reconcilable with each other. I'm not settled with a coherent explanation.
I'll just add one kind of new one based on a recent post of mine: telescopic philanthropy might be a cheaper way to solve the philanthropic, irrational urge. So by building up a narrative blacks as the most oppressed, for example, one can get the redistributive urge in society relatively cheaply sated by having a race based affirmative action that focuses on blacks.
Posted by: Hopefully Anonymous | December 23, 2008 at 01:55 AM
Maybe I'm engaging in the rational-explanation fallacy, but I find it hard to believe it exists for philanthropic reasons. I think politicians can engage in philanthropy when they have "slack", when voters are indifferent/powerless (such as which rent-seeking agribusiness gets farm subsidies). The Alchian theorem applies without such slack. When it comes to affirmative action voters are on the other side and have passed referenda prohibiting it. These laws have failed to alter the behavior of universities, leading me to believe that as with prohibition there is a powerful demand that is going to skirt the law. It's too much of a mystery why it's in the self-interest of big business to support it. They'd rather not be hit with discrimination lawsuits, and this lifts up the cream of the crop among minorities for companies to hire with an on-paper fair standard (screening by education). It's easy to understand why Democrats support it, minorities (and academics) are their constituents. Similarly, just as Republicans follow business' lead on immigration, they will do so for a.a. The universities are the glaring exception and like Robin Hanson, I don't like explaining it away with preference. I suspect that there is a self-interest explanation, but I just have no idea what it is.
Posted by: TGGP | December 23, 2008 at 05:54 PM