1. behavioral epistemology: sort of where neuroeconomics/behavioral economics and social epistemology meet.
2. behavioral game epistemology: add game theory/analysis to the mix. I'm aware of (and I think I blogged about) behavioral game theory, but I'm not aware of much explicit application of game theory analysis to social epistemology (although it's embedded/latent in game theory since some of the earliest days).
3. the "less wrong" blog is moving in a great direction. A lot of credit goes to Yudkowsky and his willingness to apparently be transparent about his own cognitive flaws.
4. I'm interested in what can come out of looking at self-control mechanisms and optimizing participation in social epistemological projects. It seems to me that deformations of social epistemological commons occur as subcomponent participants engage in at least two common forms of rent-seeking: (1) the classic one of reduced effort when detection/punishment mechanisms are too costly for the larger group, and (2) the perhaps more specifically primate one of deforming one's contributions to the social epistemological commons in such a way that optimizes one's internal sense of status (or one's external status performance). The latter seems to be what Professor Hanson bumps up against in dealing with self-described empiricism-based communities such as the medical community.