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August 2007

August 20, 2007

Not Being At The Top Of All Your Hierarchies Is Bad For Your Health

Hey "altruists",  check this out. Putting people in heirarchies where they're subordinated to you is apparently, in and of itself, good for your health and bad for theirs, according to this research. I learned about this in college years ago, but (unsurprisingly) it's not common knowledge. I think this is the primary reason people like moral hierarchies (I'm morally better than this other person) -because there's a zero sum element of personal health benefits regarding mutually acknowledged heirarchies.

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/marek.kohn/impact.html

" Review of Richard Wilkinson's The Impact of Inequality: How to Make Sick Societies Healthie"r 

This review first appeared in Prospect magazine, September 2005.

Richard Wilkinson’s latest book tells us what we already know, and that is why we need it. We know that oppressive, unequal relationships are bad, and that broadly voluntary, roughly equal relationships are good; and if we think about it we recognise that this is true for societies as well as for personal relations. Yet we take these for truisms rather than fundamental truths upon which our lives and society should be based.

Wilkinson’s project, pursued for over 25 years, is to show that these are scientific truths. The effects of inequality are counted above all in deaths. Easy to define, reliably reported, and unarguably grave, deaths make high-quality data. The foundations of the worldview presented by Wilkinson, who is Professor of Social Epidemiology at Nottingham University’s Medical School, are the correlations he finds between death rates and inequality, measured by income. As well as overall mortality statistics, there are particularly strong associations between inequality and homicide – regarded by many criminologists, according to Wilkinson, as “the most well-established relation between  homicide and any environmental factor”. The sickness to which his subtitle refers is to be understood in the broadest of senses.

It extends into areas described by less absolute measures, such as degrees of trust or hostility, which are also worse where inequality is greater. Inequality is the enemy of social cohesiveness, or social capital. What this relationship demonstrates, writes Wilkinson, “is that societies that tolerate the injustices of great inequality will almost inescapably suffer their social consequences: they will be unfriendly and violent societies, recognized more for their hostility than their hospitality”. These remarks are characteristic of Wilkinson’s way of writing, in their construction from moral and empathic language, and in their roots in empirical observation. The combination is also evident in the phrase he likes to use to describe the project on which he and others in various countries are engaged: “the science of social justice”.

His most prominent colleague is Michael Marmot, of University College London, who has led the studies which pioneered the field. Conventional wisdom views inequality in affluent societies as a residual issue: the persistence of a smallish minority whose relative poverty is accompanied by a concentration of social ills and menaces. Inequality among the remainder is not considered a problem. Even though this covers most of the range, from modest security to fantastic luxury, it is felt that all are “haves”, and that is that. Marmot’s team produced the graphs that show otherwise. Surveying Whitehall civil servants, they found that the lowest grades were about four times more likely to die during a given period than the highest. They were not impoverished, though, and they were not an underclass distinct from the rest. There was a steady gradient in death rates down the hierarchy of rank. Professional and executive grades were twice as likely to die as their bosses. Though the price of inequality is not paid equally, it is paid by almost all.

The obvious suspects, such as smoking and poor diet, were examined and found to account for only about a third of the effect. Most of the gradient was evidently being generated by the hierarchy itself. And it became apparent in a range of measures of health, from heart and gastrointestinal disease to depression and back pain. Inequality not only appears to be worse for health than smoking, but seems to be at the root of much of our illness and misery.

Findings like these are complemented by studies which imply that healthy social relations make for a healthy body. When American volunteers were exposed to cold viruses, the ones who had recently been involved in a greater variety of social relationships – with friends, relations, colleagues or fellow members of clubs and other associations – caught fewer colds than those whose networks of involvement were less rich. (The study checked for antibodies, excluding the possibility that the protective effect of social involvement arose from being exposed to more viruses and thereby developing immunity.) Among the Whitehall civil servants, studies also found that having a wide circle of friends and acquaintances, and seeing them regularly, was good for health. The effect seem to flow not from the ability to call on others at times of crisis, but rather from a background sense of social security.

This could be seen as the confidence that one could turn to others if the need arose, but that would be to underestimate the rewards of relationship. Life is an accumulation of moments in which a person is affirmed or rejected in encounters with others; a succession of pulses of happiness or hurt, with everything hanging in the balance between them. A person for whom a passing insult or a casual jibe means nothing is truly happy. At the extremes, on the streets, the slightest hint of disrespect may provoke a deadly reaction. Richard Wilkinson quotes forceful examples from prisons and the increasingly hostile culture of what used to be neighbourhoods. He also writes with unashamed candour about the everyday inner fear of humiliation, the constant anxiety that others regard us as ugly or stupid or boring. In wealthy countries, where nobody starves any longer, the approval of others is the currency that really matters.

The underlying processes, however, are likely to be primordial. They can be seen in other primates, whose health and well-being also depend upon their relations with each other. The higher a rhesus monkey ranks in the hierarchy it occupies, the less likely it is to develop atherosclerosis, the furring of the arteries that underlies heart disease. Take the highest ranking monkeys from a number of groups and put them together in a new group: they will sort themselves out into a new order, and each monkey’s chance of developing atherosclerosis depends on where it ends up in the new hierarchy. Subordination is a condition of permanent threat. Animals respond to threat by going into fight-or-flight mode, in which non-essential bodily activities are minimised. If this condition is prolonged, the animal’s body will not be properly maintained, its immune system will be inhibited, and it will suffer the corrosive effects of prolonged exposure to stress hormones.

That is the rhesus monkey condition, but is it the human condition too? The same physiological processes clearly operate, and they can be seen to operate in the dominance hierarchies that humans are so adept at creating. Unlike rhesus monkeys, however, humans are not obliged to live in dominance hierarchies. It is possible that the ancestral human condition was egalitarian. Hunter-gatherer societies tend to operate ‘counter-dominance’ systems, in which individuals are cut down to size by their fellows if they attempt to dominate the group. Now that dominance hierarchies predominate in human organisation, individuals struggle frenetically to succeed in them; but as Wilkinson puts it, to reason from this that people should remain in hierarchies is like “saying that because a drowning man struggles to keep his head above water, he needs to be kept in water”.

This image illustrates how radically anti-materialist Wilkinson’s thinking is. The struggle for status in a world of status symbols is a genuine struggle, against misery, illness and premature death, even though it takes place in a sea of luxuries. It really isn’t the money, or the things; it’s what they do for our relations with others.

At the same time, the main thrust of Wilkinson’s research has focussed on income inequalities, and this has provided an opportunity for critics who believe that the important thing about material wealth is its material effect. They have challenged the data relating income inequality to ill-health: the effect now appears extensive rather than universal. They have also advanced a “neo-materialist” alternative explanation, arguing that people need expensive goods such as cars and computers in order to thrive in an affluent society. “Psychosocial’ explanations smack to them of therapy culture and palliative politics: don’t change the conditions in which the poor live, just change the way they feel about it. Redistribute wealth, say critics like John Lynch and George Davey Smith, not feelings.

Wilkinson’s egalitarian vision plainly implies that the conditions of life must be adjusted in order to alter how people feel about them, but he is at pains to remain within the possible. His own favoured means of promoting equality sidesteps the state and concentrates on the workplace, where he sees great potential in the development of employee ownership. He also points out that the data, showing significant differences in health and social well-being among market democracies, demonstrate the benefits of equality even within the existing range of political settlements. But they also raise many questions yet to be explored, such as the extent to which, and how, the oppressive effects of hierarchy can be ameliorated by the way hierarchical relationships are conducted.

Whereas the neo-materialists have made their objections explicit, recalling the old days when the concrete left was at loggerheads with those of their comrades whose priorities were not economic, the resistance of the wider intellectual culture has been subtler. These ideas have scarcely been suppressed. Wilkinson has published two other summary expositions in the past ten years; Michael Marmot issued an account aimed at a general audience (Status Syndrome, Bloomsbury) last year. People in the policy trade and the opinion business are familiar with the propositions – but these still come as a revelation even to well-informed members of the public.

The Labour government has identified health inequalities as a problem to be addressed. It received a report by Sir Donald Acheson on the subject to which Wilkinson made submissions and which was overseen by a group that included Marmot. But the government’s understanding of the problem excludes any acknowledgement that social inequality may itself cause health inequalities. John Reid, the Health Secretary, placed the onus firmly on the disadvantaged in a speech last year, making plain the government’s view that the solution required people to choose to change their behaviour.

The science of social justice thus finds itself in the position of a man at a crowded bar who gets a nod from the bartender but can’t get served, because the other customers are more appealing and assertive. Slavoj Zizek’s extension of Donald Rumsfeld’s widely, though unjustifiedly, mocked remarks about what is known and unknown seems pertinent here. The Slovenian philosopher proposed a category of “unknown knowns”: things we don’t know we know. The reason we don’t know that we know things is that they conflict with more powerful ideas, and so we see them but fail to recognise them. The idea that inequality is a sign of economic health and social vigour is too compelling to permit serious engagement with the idea that inequality is anti-social and a cause of illness. We need to be told what we know, instinctively, about what makes a good society. Wilkinson’s book tells us, and shows us that our social instincts have become a science.

Richard G. Wilkinson, The Impact of Inequality: How to Make Sick Societies Healthier, Routledge, London, 2005"

August 15, 2007

"The Simulators want us to be interesting" = wish fulfillment bias

Robin Hansen, in OvercomingBias blog post titled "Strangeness Heuristic", quotes the NYT quoting himself speculating that being interesting maximizes persistence odds (a claim I previous read in Kurzweil's latest book).

http://www.overcomingbias.com/2007/08/strangeness-heu.html

"Maybe, as suggested by Robin Hanson, an economist at George Mason University, you should try to be as interesting as possible, on the theory that the designer is more likely to keep you around for the next simulation."

My response in the comments:

http://www.overcomingbias.com/2007/08/strangeness-heu.html#comment-79577349

"It seems to me to be completely arbitrary wish-fulfillment to believe it's more likely simulators would want us to be interesting than to be not intresting. If anything, it seems more likely that simulators would want us to try to rationally (bayesian until we develop something better) maximize our persistence odds, since that seems to be what gets best rewarded with persistence. Being an avante garde artist doesn't seem to mitigate the mortality risk of not wearing a seatbelt in our reality."

August 10, 2007

Dicussion with Nick Tarleton on Quantum Suicide, Etc.

Moving the discussion with Nick on Quantum suicide, etc. to my anonymous blog:

http://www.overcomingbias.com/2007/08/open-thread.html#comment-79021328

Nick Tarleton writes: " "Also, it becomes irrational to devote any effort into minimizing existential risk or maximizing personal persistence odds."

Not really. What if existential risk is so likely that my most likely subjective continuity is in a world with no other humans? That's no fun.

Posted by: Nick Tarleton | August 10, 2007 at 10:20 AM

My response (only on hopeanon anonymous blog):

Nick, the quantum suicide experiment you and Eliezer were discussing implies conservation of narrative in addition to subjective conscious experience. Thus I think it's unlikely that you would have all of these (1) conservation of narrative (2) conservation of subjective conscious identity (3) everyone on planet earth dead except you (4) quantum immortality for you. It seems more likely that, like the shotgun that improbably never goes off on the physicist, the various existential risks never manifest (or other people around take care of them) -at least in the series of realities that you successively blip into.

Of course, only if all that stuff is true.

More on MWI & Theory of conservation of subjective conscious experience

More on MWI & Theory of conservation of subjective conscious experience

http://www.overcomingbias.com/2007/08/open-thread.html

Combine MWI and a theory of conservation of subjective conscious experience, and it becomes rational to always put desired outcomes over preservation of life. Also, it becomes irrational to devote any effort into minimizing existential risk or maximizing personal persistence odds. One could essentially free ride off of an infinite (or a large number) of other subjective conscious selves. If only we were 100% certain that this particular model was accurate. *sigh*

The But-For Option Regarding Quantum Immortality vs. Fatalism

I just posted this comment to the open thread of overcomingbias blog. It was sparked by an exchange between Nick Tarleton and Eliezer Yudokowsky.

http://www.overcomingbias.com/2007/08/open-thread.html#comment-79016362

I've been thinking about quantum suicide too. It intuitively feels plausible to anyone who has been around a little while -we can think of all the possibly mortal accidents we avoided. Since quantum immortality is a default option, like the "we're all doomed" default option, I think we should probably focus on the but-for option, namely but for our best efforts to maximize our persistence odds, we're all doomed. Of course, one could perhaps argue that an equally likely scenario is but for our best efforts to maximize our persistence odds, we're all immortal, but if we engage in those exact efforts, we're all doomed, but I think that's probably recursive to the "we're all doomed" default option. So I'd go for the positive but-for option in terms of guiding our actions.

Morning Thoughts 8/10/07 Thursday

Morning, dear readers.

Once again my initial feeling is "I made it!". Another day alive, another day not dead yet. Sometime after 4am I once again passed through that "magical" barrier from apparently not conscious to apparently conscious, (although I suppose I repass that barrier every 1/6 of a second or so). I'm still curious about the apparent magic that rests beneath our rationalist first principles, the back between actual "reality" and the best models our tool-making, abstract thinking, primate brains have been able to come up with over the past few thousand years, as has been filtered into my own perception of apparent reality.

It's now 6:51am and I'm writing my 2nd morning post, which I intend to be a daily thing.

My round up of thoughts about the morning posts of the big blogs.
1. OvercomingBias:

A. Interesting discussion of "truth bias" by Peter McKluskey in this midnight (GMU time?) post: http://www.overcomingbias.com/2007/08/truth-bias.html As part of the post he claims " Increased suspicion may do a little harm to your friends by making them a bit more uncomfortable. But if it spreads, it should also improve political systems by making it a bit harder for people to get away with lies. This suggests that altruists ought to be more comfortable with friend who question their honesty in order to encourage social norms under which political choices are based on more accurate beliefs." I'm apparently more of an egoist than an altruist, so that suggests that perhaps I shouldn't be suspicious of my friends. This is a counterintuitive suggestion, but only because I think Peter commits the defining error of the overcomingbias blog. They tend not to distinguish between performing something and actually believing it, between doing something transparently and doing it nontransparently. Thus, although in the real world it's completely possible to be suspicious of your friends but act like you believe them in their presence, it doesn't seem to be part of the conceptual framework of possibilities in Peter's posts. Thankfully, Eliezer Yudokowsky, in his recent posts, seems to be departing from this simplistic, wrong (in my opinion) model of human social interaction.

B. Robin pounds the podium for basing policy decisions on prediction markets (futarchy) rather than opinion polls in his latest post: http://www.overcomingbias.com/2007/08/accountable-pub.html He writes, "Arbitrary dictators such as the opinion poll and voting public now are feel little pressure to admit anything.   This is why I'd prefer public policy to instead be based on a more accountable public opinion, one with more pressure to be right due to a personal penalty for being wrong.  This is the key concept behind "futarchy," or decision markets for public policy." Sounds good to me. I'd like to see much more experimentation in this area, as seems to be happening already with corporations and decision making. Rationalizing public policy will reduce existential risk and increase my personal persistence odds, it seems to me. So thanks for helping with that, Robin!

2. MarginalRevolutions: Tyler Cowen has an interesting post on the power of TV. http://www.marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2007/08/is-tv-good-for-.html  According to the article he quotes, "effects are large, equivalent in some cases to about five years of education in the cross section, and move gender attitudes of individuals in rural areas much closer to those in urban areas." Personally, I'd rather they get internet before tv, so they can communicate with the relative elite, rather than only be communicated to. It's a mystery to me why popular American message boards don't have more posts from the english speaking third world. There are by now tens of millions (or more) internet users in these countries. I wonder if they avoid popular american message boards out of politeness, diffidence, or simple disinterest or unawareness. Skype is an exception. I occasionally get random skype calls from the darndest places from random people simply interested in communicating. I wonder why that is, too?

3. Freakonomics: Levitt yesterday essential posted a mea culpa about his previous terrorism post. http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/08/09/terrorism-part-ii/ I do think it was the responsible thing to do. He ends his post with "My guess is that the second scenario — the terrorism threat just isn’t that great — is the more likely one. Which, if you think about it, is the optimistic view of the world. But that probably still makes me a moron, a traitor, or both." Perhaps situationally, yes. But it's hard to read a Bates medal winner call himself a moron and read it as something other than smug. I chalk it up to a Dershowitzian boredom of being demonstrably smarter than almost everyone, including one's audience. For that reason, I think a temptation arises to get onesself in ever deeper amounts of trouble with the public, just to try to get some mental excercise out of extricating onesself from the hole. Instead, guys, why don't you solve the hard problem of keeping me alive .. forever?!

4. Mindhacks: This has to be one of the best, most useful blogs on the internet. My brain actually hurts, like seeing a buffet with too many good things to eat, knowing I won't be able to eat even 1/2 of what i want. http://www.mindhacks.com/blog/2007/08/20070810_spike_act.html The standouts from this list? Everything but 2 items on the long list of links looked really interesting to me, but these 3 in particular stood out:
"-NPR has a radio show about a new book on 'cognitive dissonance', the process that motivates us to resolve conflicts between our thoughts and actions.
-This is Your Brain on Love. The LA Times has an article on the neuroscience of attraction and companionship.
-BBC Radio 4 sociology programme Thinking Allowed investigates friendship networks in Amazon peoples and the social psychology of shame and stigma.

5. BlackbeltBayesian: Writes about Nick Bostrom's recent lecture on "The Great Filter": http://www.acceleratingfuture.com/steven/?p=40 I don't understand what they're talking about yet, and, free rider that I aspire to be, hopefully I'll never get around to it unless I need to. But it seems interesting, and worth posting to here. Bottom line, I hope aliens don't kill me -ever. :^/

6. FuturePundit: FuturePundit offers up 5 measures to reduce mortality rates from partnership for prevention: http://www.futurepundit.com/archives/004464.html I'd really like to see smart people move from trying to save everyone to trying to save themselves -and me. We could be sacrificing existential odds by trying to pile too many people in the lifeboats. Unfortunately, this rational line of thought makes me fatalistic about my own long term persistence odds (there's a chance at some point it would be rational to kick me off the lifeboat) but I think the truly rational/optimizing move by me would be to weigh how the various approaches affect my persistence odds, not simply think in a binary way "Either we have to have a rhetoric of saving everybody, or we have a rhetoric that will one day cause a hegemonic group to eliminate me to save themselves". It's possible that the optimal solution involves saving some people, including me, but not everybody, even if that's a rather unlikely actual scenario (unlikely doesn't mean that it's impossible or won't happen, or that it's not the single best strategy for me). Well, those thoughts are rather far afield from futurepundit's more narrow post.

Today's questions for my readers. Please feel free to answer in the comments.

1. What do you speculate to be the optimal percentage of the population to save? And how do you measure them? For example, there's probably enough genetic diversity in the 1,000 smartest people in the world or so that's that's all we'd need to save from that perspective. Would they actually be better off if the rest of the population was eliminated? Or not? (If you're not one of the 1,000 smartest people in the world, you may not want to endorse that strategy).

2.How much should we free ride off of future generations, to maximize our persistence odds as the currently living?  For example, to the degree that making a play for immortality in our lifetime involves greatly increasing existential risk overall, should we do so to the degree that the balance of risk vs. reward is favorable to us as the currently living? How about for us as the currently 18+ vs. those under 18?

3. Who are the most charismatic currently living people with a Ph.D. in mathematics? physics? the equivalents (such as computer science or statistics)? economics? How does that correlate with their heirarchical and material success? And to what degree do you think their charisma/social intelligence is informed by that quantitative knowledge and abilities?

August 09, 2007

My Stylistic Complaint About MarginalRevolution Blog post Using "Nanny State" descriptively

Recent marginalrevolution blog post about attempts of dying people and due process rights to drugs (as one might guess, I support access to the drugs), and my comment to the post, which so far is limited to a stylistic complaint.

I'm going to try to make mirror posts of all my blog comments to this blog, so that readers can have a consolidated location for my writings, and so you know that those other posts aren't made by imposters or people who randomly chose the same posting name.

http://www.marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2007/08/no-right-to-sav.html#comment-78912018

"Isn't it a bit silly to use belief-as-cheer/belief-as-attire phrases like "nanny state" on a blog of this calibre? I think it brings down the quality of discourse here. I think here we're looking more for a deconstructiona and analysis of sloganeering than a subjection to it. This is an academic blog not dailykos or thecorner."

Very smart guy, Michael Anisimov's (sp?) Recent Post on Existential Risk

I like how Michael Anisimov (sp?) is thinking, with this recent post "Existential Risk: Serious Business". I like to think that my recent anonymous posts on this topic on a variety of blog comment sections were rather large butterfly wings encouraging these storm winds of expressed concern in the singularitarian community.

http://www.acceleratingfuture.com/michael/blog/?p=527

Reading posts like this make me a little more optimistic about my persistence odds. Nick Tarletons of the world, please take note.

Morning Thoughts

I'm going to try to do this every morning if I have time. Put down my thoughts for the morning. Feedback is welcome in the comments.

1. I'm still alive. I'm very thankful for that. It's still fundamentally a mystery to me that period of time where I'm not conscious after I fall asleep, to that period of time when I wake up and I'm conscious again. I'm aware all of these things are being studied and have been studied, but there seem to be inherent limits to our modeling ability, etc., such that there's "magic" behind the first principles of every scientific observation and explanation of apparent reality. Similarly, there seems to be some impenetrable magic leading up to those first morning thoughts. Happy to discuss this more with anyone else fascinated by that passed barrier to first morning consciousness.

2. What am I going to do today? I use all sorts of conventional mechanisms (GTD, 43things.com, etc.) to maximize what I get done each day. Today is no different. I'd like to optimize further my productivity though. I wonder to what degree I can get benefit from bias reduction and learning bayesian reasoning in increasing my personal productivty. I'm looking for things that actually work, not buzzwords.

3. My thoughts on overcomingbias.com this morning. Robin Hansen put up a piece on Spencer, with relatively little personal analysis. I could care less about lassiez faire capitalism vs. communism and all the variants along the different spectrums, except how they affect outcomes for me (maximizing my personal odds of persistence). Eliezer also put up a poem. It seems nice and relevant, but I'm not sure what wisdom if any it captures. The comments on rape vs. stealing bread are still going strong. I'm disappointed Robin seems to be ignoring my point that in the anglosphere the salient distinction (even if it's irrational) seems to be crimes against person vs. crimes against property (or as he's reframed it recently, forced charity of person vs. property). I guess he has sex on the brain, and so is resisting the broader (but more accurate in my opinion) reframe.

4. My thoughts on freakonomics this morning. I haven't seen it since late last night. I think the move to the new york times was a mistake by Dubner Levitt. I think they lose independent credibility and don't gain much. But I think it was genius move by NY Times. Way to drive traffic to their newly free again opinion section. As for the brainstorming by Levitt and commenters on how to maximize on terrorist attacks, it's an empirical question whether this approach putatively to promote transparency is smart or stupid. Even if it's stupid for us, it can be smart for Levitt since the public will pay the externalities whereas he accrues the attention benefits.

That's it for now. Questions I'm throwing out for readers:

1. Who is the single best personal persistence maximizer alive today? Is it Ray Kurzweil? Or someone else?

2. Who is the single best free rider alive today? Carlos Helu Slim? George W. Bush? Oprah Winfrey? Or someone else?

3. What person living today is most likely to be successfully "uploaded" first? What do you think your odds are of beating them to first "upload", if you desired to.

August 07, 2007

Chris Capel aka pdf23ds = smart guy

Here's Chris' recent comment on Eliezer's recent post on the proper use of bias on the overcomingbias.com blog. It was an intelligent and well-written comment, in my opinion. The second link is to his blog.

http://www.overcomingbias.com/2007/08/the-proper-use-.html#comment-78644320

http://pdf23ds.net/